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There is a growing backlash against AIDS-related funding on the grounds that 
too many resources have been allocated to the AIDS response, especially to 
antiretroviral treatment (ART). Proponents claim that health systems have been 
undermined, money wasted and misdirected, and that Africans themselves 
believe AIDS resources should be allocated elsewhere. We argue that such 
sweeping generalisations are not supported by the evidence and that the 
backlash fails to recognise the cross-cutting nature of the AIDS response, the 
powerful role that civil society organisations can play in holding governments to 
account and the potential for building better health systems on the back of 
AIDS-specific interventions.1 The paper also discusses the contributions of 
economists William Easterly (2006) and Mead Over (2008) to the backlash, 
arguing that economists can contribute most constructively when they inform 
rather than pre-empt social choice, cast their analytical nets broadly rather than 





The age of rapidly expanding financial resources to combat AIDS is over. The 
global economic crisis has cut into the resources available for foreign aid at 
precisely the moment when more resources are needed to support millions of 
newly poor people (World Bank, 2009). The US is already falling short on its 
President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) commitments (GAA, 
2009) and Michel Sidibé, the Executive Director of UNAIDS, will struggle to 
mobilise the $25 billion needed from donors and affected country governments 
to meet HIV prevention and ART targets over the next two years.  
 
Sidibé’s task has been made harder by the widely-held view that AIDS-specific 
funding has had more than its fair share of development resources already. 
Global funding for AIDS rose from $1.6 billion in 2001 to $10 billion in 2007 
and to $13.7 billion in 2009 (UNAIDS, 2008: 188; Sidibé, 2009: 4). The WHO’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH, 2001) set the stage for this 
                                                 
1 This part of the paper draws on and expands the argument in Nattrass and Gonsalves (2009).  
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global response by highlighting the beneficial impact of enhanced funding for 
health (including AIDS) on economic growth and human development. The 
initial growth in funding, impetus, boosted significantly in 2003 by the  World 
Health Organisation’s ‘3 by 5’ campaign and the creation of the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and Malaria, reflected a growing concern about 
the exceptional impact of AIDS and the socio-economic dangers it posed for the 
world (UNAIDS 2006: 5). Bilateral efforts, notably the US government’s 
PEPFAR, together with unprecedented contributions from private foundations 
(notably Gates) and the mobilising efforts of the Clinton Foundation, 
contributed further to the global response. An estimated four million people in 
developing countries now owe their lives to this international effort to scale up 
ART (Sidibé, 2009).  
 
However, even before the global economic crisis, and at the height of the long 
boom which underpinned the increase in global funding for AIDS, a backlash 
was evident. The common theme was that the ‘AIDS lobby’ had garnered an 
‘unfair’ amount of resources, was wasting them on socially dubious expenditure 
and that the money should rather be allocated to other objectives (see e.g. 
Garrett, 2007). Some claimed that UNAIDS had deliberately inflated HIV 
estimates (Chin, 2007; Pisani, 2008). This resulted in high-level calls for a 
‘major over-haul of the international AIDS response’ (Lewis and Donovan, 
2007: 532) and defensive responses from UNAIDS and the WHO (De Lay and 
De Kock, 2007). Others argued that UNAIDS had misdirected its program 
efforts, although they differed over whether the resources should rather have 
gone into addressing poverty and development (Stillwaggon, 2006)2 or more 
aggressively into sexual behaviour change (Epstein 2007, 2008; Pisani 2008; 
Chin, 2007).3   
 
                                                 
2 Stillwaggon believes that AIDS is fundamentally a disease of poverty and that the best way 
of combating AIDS would have been simply to promote economic development and poverty 
reduction. This argument, however, does not stand up to scrutiny: while poor people certainly 
find it difficult to cope with HIV (Barnett and Whiteside, 2002; Poku, 2005), it is not the case 
that HIV specifically targets the poor or poor countries (e.g. Gillespie et al. 2007; Mishra et 
al. 2007). There is no evidence to support the claim that channelling AIDS-related 
international assistance away from AIDS interventions and towards poverty alleviation is an 
appropriate way of fighting HIV. Nor is there any reason to believe that raising incomes of 
poor people will necessarily reduce HIV incidence. 
3 Note that Chin and Epstein’s criticism of UNAIDS, an organization with an uncertain 
mandate and a constituency of many different UN agencies which pull it in different 
directions, invests it with a power to affect the epidemic that the organization simply does not 
have. Failure to reach at-risk populations is less a fault of UNAIDS than it is of member states 
of the UN itself, particularly in Africa (see e.g. De Waal 2006). 
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The core of the backlash, however, came from those asserting that AIDS-related 
funding had undermined health systems in developing countries. In a series of 
opinion pieces in the British Medical Journal, Roger England (2007a, 2007b, 
2008) argued that AIDS is not the ‘global catastrophe’ claimed by ‘AIDS 
exceptionalists’, that donor aid for AIDS is out of proportion to the contribution 
of AIDS to overall disease burden and that it would have been more cost-
effective to put the money into bed nets, immunisations and childhood diseases. 
He accuses UNAIDS of creating and imposing ‘the biggest vertical programme 
in history’ which has eroded the public health sector (by diverting human 
resources), undermined government efficiency (with additional reporting 
requirements and poorly co-ordinated donor activities) and effectively removed 
national control over spending priorities. He proposes that UNAIDS be shut 
down and that money be withheld from the Global Fund until it joins sector-
wide basket fund arrangements to combine donor and domestic funding (2008: 
1072). In his view, funding for health systems and funding for HIV amounts to a 
zero-sum game: ‘until we do put HIV in its place, countries will not get the 
delivery systems they need.’ (2007b: 1073).    
  
However, contrary to England’s assertions, the balance of evidence suggests that 
AIDS funding has not been excessive nor at the cost of other health programs. 
WHO funding has been shown to be in line with the burden of disease caused by 
AIDS (De Lay et al, 2007; Stuckler et al, 2008: 1565) – a finding that is 
supported by more recent analysis of the cross-country relationship between the 
share of spending on AIDS and the contribution of AIDS to the disease burden 
(Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009).  As shown in Figure 1, AIDS spending from all 
sources (domestic and foreign) in 2006/7 as a percentage of total health 
spending was on average lower than the share of disability adjusted life years 
(DALYs) lost to AIDS. The simple regression line indicates that a one 
percentage point increase in the share of AIDS DALYs was accompanied, on 
average, by an increase of only half a percentage point in the share of AIDS in 
total health spending. All the hyper epidemic countries of Southern Africa are 
below the 45˚ line – indicating that the share of AIDS spending is lower than the 
burden of disease caused by AIDS.    
 
Note also that even though AIDS-specific funding rose from less than 10% of 
health-related aid in the early 1990s to over a third in 2003, stabilising back 
down to about a quarter in 2005, the fact that the total health budget quadrupled 
in real terms over the period meant that all categories of health expenditure were 
able to rise (Shiffman, 2007: 97; Yu et al, 2008). Thus, although there are cases 
of AIDS spending crowding out other spending (World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Report, 2009; WHO MPSCG, 2009), AIDS spending in aggregate 
did not ‘crowd out’ other health-related spending.   
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Figure 1: AIDS spending as % of total health spending vs the share of 
AIDS in the total burden of disease (in Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009). 
 
 
In addition, if one takes into account the way in which the fight against AIDS 
has broadened beyond health interventions targeted at HIV, the AIDS response 
looks less like “the biggest vertical programme in history”, and more like the 
biggest horizontal programme in history.4 To begin with, the relationship 
between AIDS and TB, which in most parts of the world can be considered a co-
epidemic, means that AIDS and TB programming should be (and increasingly 
are) inextricably linked. In fact, the resurgence of interest in TB in the last 
decade or so has largely arisen because of the AIDS response. The linkage 
between AIDS and hepatitis C infection in drug users, the link between human 
papilloma virus and cervical cancer in HIV-positive women and sexually 
transmitted diseases in general, means that when talking about AIDS, one is 
talking about a far larger network of infectious diseases, which has required a 
coordinated response. Moving beyond health, AIDS has involved a multi-
sectoral response which has cut across disciplines, ministries and people’s lives 
to involve issues around education, human rights, and industrial practices. AIDS 
has driven money and resources into a wide set of health and development areas 
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and that this phenomenon has driven a need to manage AIDS and related efforts 
horizontally in most places, across ministries and programmes. 
 
There is, nevertheless, a basis for some of the backlash concerns, notably: that in 
some cases AIDS programs may have attracted human resources away from the 
primary health sector; that AIDS spending may have crowded out government 
spending in other areas (though this appears to be the case only in countries like 
Zambia, Mozambique and Uganda facing IMF-imposed fiscal ceilings); that the 
detailed reporting requirements of foreign donors have increased administrative 
burdens on already-over burdened service providers; that the cultural values of 
donors have inappropriately shaped AIDS programs in developing countries; 
and that greater synergies could have been achieved if HIV interventions had 
been better co-ordinated between donors and with the public health system (see 
Yu et al, 2008; Shakow, 2006; Epstein, 2007; World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group, 2009; WHO MPSCG, 2009). Even so, there is substantial 
evidence indicating that AIDS programs probably strengthened the overall 
health response, especially in places such as Cambodia, Haiti, Mexico, Lesotho, 
Ethiopia, Botswana, Rwanda and South Africa (e.g. Walton et al, 2004; Koenig 
et al, 2004; Kifle et al, 2008; Yu et al, 2008; Steinberg, 2007, Piot et al, 2009; 
Global Fund, 2009; El-Sadr and Abrams, 2007; WHO MPSCG, 2009).5  And, 
while 82% of World Bank funded AIDS projects, many of which were 
conducted as emergency responses in difficult situations, have been deemed 
unsatisfactory (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2009), 94% of 
AIDS projects funded by the Global Fund were evaluated as successful (Global 
Fund, 2009).   
 
It is now widely accepted that more research is needed into the relationship 
between AIDS programming and overall health systems capacity, and that more 
effort is required to build better synergies between disease-specific interventions 
and health systems support6 (Ooms et al, 2007; Yu et al, 2008; MPSCG, 2009). 
But this is hardly news for UNAIDS/WHO which has long stressed the need to 
address systemic constraints on disease-specific interventions (e.g. WHO 2006; 
UNAIDS 2007).7 This is why over a third of Global Fund grants have 
effectively been allocated for health systems strengthening (Piot et al, 2009: 3; 
                                                 
5 Health Ministers in Lesotho, Mexico and Ethiopia spoke out at the 2008 Mexico 
International AIDS conference about the benefits of AIDS funding for the strengthening of 
their health systems.  
6 There is a ‘positive synergies’ research effort underway under the auspices of the 
International Health Partnership which should be reporting by mid 2009.  
7 See also UN General Assembly, Sixtieth session, Agenda item 45: Follow-up to the outcome 
of the twenty-sixth special session: Implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS (available on:  
http://data.unaids.org/pub/InformationNote/2006/20060324_HLM_GA_A60737_en.pdf 
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Global Fund, 2009). The import of the backlash has not been to put new insights 
on the table, but rather to fuel a political struggle between donors, development 
agencies and non-governmental organisations over foreign aid and to empower 
those wishing to extract resources for general health systems support and to 
channel that money through country-governments, sidelining civil society 
organisations in the process.   
 
This is a serious problem for the innovative AIDS programming which made the 
roll-out of ART possible in developing countries. The lessons learned from the 
fight against AIDS, notably the importance of community mobilisation and 
involving health-care consumers in decision-making, have been drowned by a 
new discourse of ‘country ownership’ (read ‘government control’) and ‘sector 
wide approaches’. This has already had a major impact via the International 
Health Partnership (IHP) of 16 countries (launched in September 2007) which 
channels donor funding primarily from Europe to developing country 
governments. Although the founding ‘compact’ is not explicitly hostile to AIDS 
funding (indeed, AIDS is mentioned and the document is signed by UNAIDS),8 
it set the stage for what has become a revisionist agenda where Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) 4 and 5 (to promote maternal and child health) 
have been pitted against AIDS (MDG 6) and where broader health systems 
support has been pitted against, rather than built on the success of, AIDS-related 
interventions.  
 
In September 2008, Gordon Brown (the Prime Minister of the UK and leading 
member and proponent of the IHP) announced a new initiative with the World 
Bank: the Task Force for Innovative International Financing for Health Systems. 
Echoing backlash claims as if they were stylised facts, the document states that 
MDGs 4 and 5 have been ‘neglected’ relative to AIDS9 and that priority should 
be given to sector-wide approaches and general health systems support (TIIFHS, 
2009). In a concrete manifestation of the mood of the times, the Global Fund 
was not included in the Task Force – despite it having developed various 
                                                 
8 Available on: http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/pdf/IHP_compact.pdf 
9 The report claims that in 2006, ‘more than 50% of external funding for health provided 
directly to countries supported MDG6, leaving only $2.25 per capita for everything else’ 
(TIIFHS, 2009: 1). The report goes on to assume that MDGs 4 and 5 have been ‘neglected’. 
Firstly, the basis for this calculation is unclear and almost certainly fails to account for the fact 
that a lot of AIDS funding is directly supportive of maternal and child health (notably 
prevention of mother to child transmission). Secondly, simply contrasting the money for 
AIDS and the money for other MDGs is insufficient grounds for concluding that the other 
MDGs have therefore been ‘neglected’ (ibid: 2) because of AIDS.   
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innovative funding mechanisms, and despite committing AIDS-related funding 
to general health systems support as part of country grants.10     
 
In some respects we are witnessing a revival of the primary health care agenda 
articulated most famously in 1978 at Alma Ata.11 But this appears to be 
happening without taking on board the key lessons of the intervening decades. 
The first is that pitting ‘vertical’ against ‘horizontal’ approaches is unhelpful 
because some health interventions were better suited to vertical programs (e.g. 
the eradication of small pox) whereas others (such as malaria control) work 
better when integrated within broader public health initiatives (Mills, 2005). The 
experience of the AIDS response has also taught us the value of ‘diagonal’ 
health interventions which integrate disease-specific protocols with broader 
supply chain management, human resource development and preventative 
screening (Ooms et al, 2008).   
 
The second lesson of the failed primary health agenda is that adopting an old-
style public administration approach to health planning without being alert to the 
‘underlying patterns of accountability and incentives’ which affect 
implementation (World Bank, 2004: 316) is doomed to failure. The key 
weakness of the Alma Ata agenda was that insufficient attention was paid to the 
political-economy of decision-making within government, and to the ways in 
which institutional and political constraints at country-level undermine the 
intentions of donors and planners (see e.g. Easterly, 2006). In the absence of 
easily measurable outputs and clear, politically feasible and sustainable 
mechanisms to hold government to account, funds for general budget support 
can all too easily vanish out of the health system, killing priority interventions 
entirely. As the Zambian experience shows, when donors in the late 1990s 
switched from supporting the vertical TB programme in favour of an 
‘integrated’ approach, the TB program effectively ground to a halt (Bosman, 
2000). An ill-considered shift from AIDS-specific to general funding could have 
the same result.   
 
In sum, we argue that the growing disenchantment with AIDS-related funding 
does not have a sound evidential basis and the shift towards sector-wide 
                                                 
10 The head of the Global Fund and the Global AIDS Vaccine Initiative were reduced to 
writing a letter to the leaders of the Task Team, (Brown and Zoellick) saying that they were, 
and continued to be supportive of health systems development and have developed various 
innovative financing mechanisms. See:  
http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/pdf/IHP%20Update%2013/Taskforce/london%
20meeting/new/GAVI%20and%20GFATM%20letter.pdf 
11 The Alma-Ata Declaration from the 1978 International Conference on Primary Health Care 
is available on: http://www.who.int/hpr/NPH/docs/declaration_almaata.pdf 
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approaches pays insufficient attention to political-economic constraints. It is also 
our contention that economists have contributed to the backlash through their 
rhetoric and flawed analysis. While a similar critique could be made of other 
social scientists, we focus in the second part of this paper on economics because 
it comprises a powerful set of tools for analysing trade-offs and influencing 
public policy. Indeed, one of us (Nicoli Nattrass) has used these tools to 
demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of mother to child transmission prevention in 
South Africa, thereby assisting the Treatment Action Campaign in its successful 
campaign to change government policy (Nattrass, 2004). But economic 
modelling, whilst appearing to be ‘technical’ and ‘scientific’, is often built on 
assumptions which are far from self-evident, or even justified by the facts or 
social values. The other author of this paper (Gregg Gonsalves) is an 
international AIDS activist and as such faces the challenge of being typecast as 
an advocate promoting ‘sectional’ interests. Yet economists rarely consider the 
ways in which they too may be partisans. Unlike Gregg, whose activist role and 
identity is clear, the economists we focus on below are also advocates – but 
sneakily so because they do so under the cloak and authority of economics.     
 
We highlight three types of flawed reasoning:   
 
1) Assuming that ‘optimal’ economic estimates/conclusions are necessarily 
best for society – irrespective of what people may want or think. We call 
this the ‘omniscient economist fallacy’.  
2) Assuming that the narrow application of economic techniques is 
necessarily appropriate to policy questions which may be better (or at 
least differently) addressed taking into account a broader range of inputs 
and factors. We call this the ‘myopic economist fallacy’.  
3) Concluding that because Policy A has faults, Policy B is necessarily better 
even though Policy B has not been interrogated to the same level of 
rigour. This is a version of the fallacious ‘argument from ignorance’. 
 
The rest of the paper discusses two important contributions by economists to the 
backlash against AIDS-specific funding for ART. The first, by William Easterly 
(2006) in many ways shaped the backlash and gave it legitimacy. The second, 
more recent, intervention by Mead Over (2008), is explicitly political in that it is 
framed as advice for the new US President, but employs much of the technical 





Easterly’s ‘Searchers’ and the Political-
Economy of ART 
 
Easterly argues in his influential book, The White Man’s Burden, that ‘it is the 
job of economists to point out trade-offs’ and not to make ‘utopian’ claims about 
spending ‘whatever it takes’ (2006: 256). He accuses the WHO 2001 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) of such utopianism for 
recommending an increase in developing country health budgets of 2% of GNP, 
and in donor country health assistance by 0.1% of their GNP, to improve 
primary health care, maternal and childhood health and to combat AIDS, 
malaria and TB (CMH, 2001: 6-12). Easterly complains that the CMH report 
was ‘influential in gaining adherents for AIDS treatment in poor countries’ – a 
bad thing in his opinion because, he believes, more deaths could be prevented if 
the expanded budget had been allocated to other priorities (ibid: 258).  
 
He specifically takes the CMH to task for not confronting trade-offs: 
“In an obscure footnote to the report, the commission notes that people 
often asked it what its priorities would be if only a lower sum were 
forthcoming, but it says it was “ethically and politically” unable to choose. 
The most charitable view is that this statement is the commission’s strategy 
to get the money it wants. Otherwise, this refusal to make choices is 
inexcusable. Public policy is the science of doing the best you can with 
limited resources – it is a dereliction of duty for professional economists to 
shrink from confronting trade-offs. Even when you get new resources, you 
still have to decide where they would be best used” (2006: 256-7).  
 
But consider what the Commission actually said (footnote 24): 
“Many have asked the Commission what to do if the donor money is not 
made available – in essence, how to triage with less money. We are asked 
to prioritise millions of readily preventable deaths per year, since we have 
already narrowed our focus to a small number of conditions that have an 
enormous social burden and that have low-cost interventions that are at 
least partially effective. Not only is this kind of triaging ethically and 
politically beyond our capacity, but it is also exceedingly hard to do in a 
sensible way. Those who hope for a simple answer, for example to focus on 
the cheap interventions (immunisations) while putting off the expensive 
interventions (higher cost prevention programs and antiretroviral therapy 
needed to fight AIDS) to a later date, misjudge the practical choices we 
face. The AIDS pandemic will destroy African economic development 
unless controlled; to fight measles, but not AIDS, will not begin to meet 
Africa’s human and economic needs. It would be wrong to go to the other 
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extreme as well, and let the legitimate need to fight AIDS end up starving 
the cheaper interventions, so we advocate both. Moreover, the 
infrastructure developed to fight AIDS will support the infrastructure 
needed to fight measles, especially if strengthening such complementarities 
is explicitly built into the AIDS control effort. It is vastly more fruitful to 
design and finance a comprehensive program that addresses many critical 
health needs than to pick and choose the apparently inexpensive items” 
(CMH, 2001: 113-4).  
 
Contrary to Easterly’s caricature of its argument, the CMH was not shirking its 
duty to do economic analysis – it was simply taking more factors into account 
than is the case with standard cost-effectiveness comparisons of isolated 
interventions. It was also making a serious point about complementarities 
between building infrastructure for health and combating AIDS, and between 
health and development outcomes. Easterly ignores, rather than responds to, this 
broader analysis (thereby committing the ‘myopic economist fallacy’). 
 
This narrow focus on ranking isolated interventions (money for ART vs. money 
for health systems) is at the intellectual heart of the backlash against AIDS-
specific interventions. By shifting the analysis away from macroeconomic 
impact/benefits and systemic complementarities, the exceptional impact of 
AIDS on human development – and the exceptional potential for the AIDS 
response to address it – is essentially disregarded.  This is a major flaw because 
the impact of ART extends far beyond the impact on the individual receiving it.   
 
Consider the case of South Africa, where one fifth of the adult population is 
HIV-positive. In the absence of an ART rollout, life expectancy would have 
dropped from 61 years in 1996 to 46 by 2010. However, as shown in Figure 2, 
rolling out Mother to Child Transmission Prevention (MTCTP) and ART from 
the early 2000s reduced the fall to 56. This was because ART extended lives and 
helped prevent new HIV infections. The preventative impact of ART on HIV 
incidence is, of course, a product of the design of the demographic model 
(ASSA2003)12 – but the assumptions are consistent with (indeed, are based on) a 
substantial literature demonstrating that ART reduces infectivity and that 
concerns about large-scale behavioural disinhibition (i.e. people engaging in 
riskier sex because of ART) are unwarranted (see review of evidence in 
Nattrass, 2007 and Granich et al, 2009). ART has preventive effects, and the 
combination of prolonging life and preventing new infections has a profound 
impact on key development indicators like life expectancy. This is what makes 
                                                 
12 The ASSA2003 model is the latest available demographic model from the Actuarial Society of South Africa. It 
is available from: http://www.actuarialsociety.org.za/Aids_Model-269.aspx 
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AIDS and the AIDS response exceptional in ways that simply do not apply to 




Figure 2: The Impact of the AIDS Response on Life Expectancy and HIV 
Incidence in South Africa (projections using the ASSA2003 model) 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the impact of rolling out ART on infant mortality. The top three 
lines are modelled outcomes (again, using ASSA2003). It shows that rolling out 
MTCTP substantially reduces infant mortality, but that an ART rollout 
magnifies the effect (by reducing new adult HIV infections and reducing the risk 
of transmission from mother to child). The figure also shows the sharp decline in 
infant mortality which took place in Khayelitsha – an outcome which has been 
attributed by the City of Cape Town to the AIDS response (Azevedo, 2007). 
Contrasting funding for AIDS (MDG 6) with money going to MDG 4 (child 
health) makes no sense in this context. The complementarities are simply too 
strong to ignore.  
 
Equally importantly, one needs to consider the practical challenges of 
implementing policies and to build that explicitly into the analysis. Easterly’s 
important contribution is to highlight the need to take political and institutional 
constraints seriously. Our difficulty with his analysis, however, is that he does 
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Economists are taught that tools such as cost-effectiveness and macroeconomic 
modelling can assist in finding optimal outcomes. But the lessons of public 
choice theory and political-economy are that such plans can be contested, 
subverted and misdirected. This can lead to a form of ‘cognitive dissonance’ in 
which economists veer from the idealistic promotion of optimal outcomes to 
cynical assessments of why these optimal strategies are unlikely to be 
implemented effectively, if at all. Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden, is a clear 
example: whist exhorting economists to do good work, most of the volume rests 
on his distinction between ‘searchers’, i.e. innovative agents who respond to 
local conditions, and ‘planners’ in governments and aid agencies who impose 
their priorities on others, fail to motivate people to carry out their plans and 
never check to see if the poor actually benefitted from them (2006: 5-6). His 
frustration with planners is so great that he actually concludes that ‘the right 
plan is to have no plan’ (2006: 5). But in the next breath he suggests that a 
different plan (to ARVs) should have been drawn up – i.e. involving 
interventions like bed nets and vaccinations which are ‘simpler for searchers to 
find ways to administer’ than ART (ibid: 260).  
 
Easterly assumes that the interventions he favours are what the poor would 
prefer (thereby committing the ‘omniscient economist fallacy’). Asking the poor 
what they want is, of course, not easy. Yet public opinion is important and 
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range of indicators which suggest that significant numbers of poor people 
support greater spending on health care and on AIDS specifically. For example, 
there is substantial support for civil society organisations like the Treatment 
Action Campaign from poor people13 and the ‘Afrobarometer’ surveys in 
Southern Africa routinely show strong preferences for prioritising health 
spending, including on AIDS (Nattrass, 2004: 63-5; Nattrass, 2009). In the 2005 
Afrobarometer survey of 18 countries, Health/AIDS was one of the top three 
concerns of respondents (typically coming in third after unemployment/income 
and food/famine) and the majority of respondents in most countries reported that 
they would prefer more money to go on AIDS even if it meant less money for 
other priorities like education (see fuller discussion in Nattrass, 2009). Although 
Easterly frames ART as an invention of Northern NGOs and ‘planners’, it is also 
worth emphasising that it was organisations with strong support from the poor in 
places like Brazil, Thailand and South Africa which underpinned the activism 
that made the expansion of ART in the developing world possible.14 
 
More problematically, Easterly provides no analysis of how and why his 
alternative agenda to ART will be successful. He seems to assume that simply 
moving away from a supposedly externally driven and planner oriented ART 
intervention will automatically result in a better, ‘searcher driven’ alternative. 
 
Easterly, of course, is correct to highlight the problems of self-interested 
inefficient bureaucrats. Everyone, including the IHP, would like to see bold and 
energetic innovators/’searchers’ taking on the crumbling health systems in 
developing countries, holding government officials to account and demanding 
access to basic health care for all. So, the question then becomes: how do we 
nurture and support such champions?  Our answer is that the history of AIDS 
treatment activism suggests that community organisations and activists can 
provide the necessary fertile ground and support structures for the change agents 
we need. Ironically, then, it is precisely because AIDS is an issue that produces 
cadres of committed and motivated activists in AIDS affected countries (and 
which are increasingly networked globally) that we have seen – for the first time 
– concerted community action in support of AIDS treatment and better health 
                                                 
13 The Treatment Action Campaign has branches throughout the country, even in deep rural 
areas, and can mobilize thousands of people for large marches. Indeed, the constraint on the 
numbers attending marches is the cost of bussing people to the march.   
14 National leaders of AIDS civil society organisation (like Treatment Action Campaign in 
South Africa and the AIDS Support Organisation in Uganda) are more likely to be educated 
and middle class than the typical member. But their effectiveness depends on their ability to 
mobilise people at grass roots level, and the support they are increasingly getting from new 
leaders drawn from poorer and more working class backgrounds.      
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care. As Yu et al noted in a recent assessment of the evidence on the relationship 
between AIDS spending and health systems:  
‘AIDS activists increasingly advocate for the right of access to universal 
primary health care. They have also changed the dynamics between health 
care providers and clients, thus helping prepare health systems for the 
delivery of chronic care, which requires much more give-and-take between 
care providers and their clients than does the delivery of acute care. Indeed 
it is the activism for AIDS that has created solidarity about health as a 
concern for humanity, and as part of the evolving paradigm on 
globalization’ (2008: 6). 
 
In other words, not only does it make sense technically to develop health 
infrastructure that supports AIDS interventions and other primary health care 
objectives (as suggested by the CMH), but the political dynamics are such that 
one is more likely to see developing country governments held to account by 
activists who are, by the very nature of their illness, seeking both AIDS 
treatment and better health care services. As it is impossible to manage HIV 
disease effectively without medical personnel, laboratory services, diagnostic 
tools, a safe and reliable supply of drugs, primary health care facilities and 
referral hospitals etc, a successful ART rollout is necessarily a ‘diagonal’ 
program requiring health care strengthening. As AIDS becomes a chronic 
manageable illness with the advent of ART, it becomes more and more a disease 
of primary care rather than specialist concern, requiring health systems in 
developing countries to move from an emphasis on acute care to a chronic 
disease model, and one in which activists for better overall primary healthcare 
and AIDS treatment have a common stake.  
 
To reiterate the point we made earlier:  the need to strengthen health systems as 
part of the AIDS response has long been recognised by UNAIDS and the Global 
Fund. Civil society organisations have also been endorsing and carrying through 
this agenda for some time (for example, the Treatment Action Campaign’s 
mobilisation to integrate MTCTP and reproductive health services, and to 
integrate TB and ART services).15 It is a myth that AIDS interventions are 
necessarily stand-alone, interventions that undermine the public health system 
and that AIDS activists are unconcerned about broader public health. There is 
clearly a need to strengthen health systems, but we should be doing this in 
partnership with effective community-lead AIDS organisations and by finding 
new ways of harnessing the energies of civil society to demand better public 
health systems and to hold governments to account.  
 
                                                 
15 Details of these campaigns can be found on www.tac.org.za 
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Given the current push from within the IHP for general budgetary support to 
country governments, the need to ensure accountability and efficiency is now 
the key issue. Yet the IHP has not moved beyond vague calls for ‘good 
governance’, for the development of ‘technically sound’ health strategies, and 
for ‘efficient and effective service delivery arrangements’. The Task Team (on 
innovative finance) acknowledges that this entails changing the ways in which 
governments currently deliver health care – but at the same time insists that any  
transformation and capacity creation must respond to ‘domestically driven 
reform agendas’ (TIIFHS, 2009: 4). While this could imply broader domestic 
constituencies than governments, the Task Team effectively endorses national 
government control (a very UN stance). The fundamental problem with this – as 
articulated most cogently by Easterly himself – is that the political-economic 
obstacles to meaningful institutional reform are entirely side-stepped. The Task 
Team acknowledges the usefulness of holding officials to account, but is silent 
on how this is best achieved. Working constructively with the ‘AIDS sector’, 
rather than pitting the general health agenda against the AIDS agenda, is an 
obvious way forward – and one which the WHO MPSCG has recently endorsed 
(2009).     
 
We now turn to a discussion of a more recent contribution by an economist to 
the backlash: that by Mead Over (2008).    
 
 
Mead Over: ART as the New Dependency  
 
The rhetoric in the title of Mead Over’s recent article, ‘Prevention Failure: The 
Ballooning Entitlement Burden of US Global AIDS Treatment Spending and 
What to Do’ speaks volumes. In contrast to the CMH which regarded ART as an 
investment in human capital and development, Over depicts PEPFAR as an 
‘international transfer program, comparable perhaps to US food assistance’ 
(2008: 6). In the paper he argues further that the issue is complicated because: 
‘these beneficiaries are vitally dependent on continued receipt of AIDS 
treatment and linked to an international network of articulate AIDS 
treatment advocates, any withdrawal of treatment funding which threatens 
their lives will expose the governments of the US and other donor countries 
to reputational risk at home and abroad and may threaten US politicians at 
the ballot box’ (ibid: 14).  
 
Over is, of course, correct in that transfers from rich countries are keeping poor 
people alive on ART in developing countries. Our concern here is with his 
discourse, and the way in which his argument has been constructed to 
undermine this new (but fragile) form of global solidarity. In the context of US 
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political debate, and in which his piece is an explicit intervention, welfare is a 
highly charged subject: from Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton and beyond, 
‘welfare’ has been a dirty word, which conjures up the image of lazy, poor 
people, usually of African-American descent (e.g. Ronald Reagan’s ‘welfare 
queens’), who do not deserve social or economic support and welfare programs 
have been targeted for ‘reform’ or elimination (e.g. Clinton’s welfare reform 
initiative). Over’s framing of PEPFAR as an example of a ‘new welfare 
program’ resonates with this political stance.  More problematically, it gives an 
illusion of coherence to an argument which in many fundamental ways ignores 
the evidence about ART.   
 
Over worries (understandably) about the fact that the US is responsible for about 
¾ of the total external AIDS funding burden and hence bares most of the burden 
of entitlements (ibid: 14-5). He reports that depending on the scale up 
assumptions, the number of people on ART funded by the USA will rise to 5.4 
million by 2016 (costing $4.5 billion – i.e. about a fifth of the USA entire 
overseas aid budget) or, if one assumes a scale up to 95% coverage, to 15 
million (costing $11.6 billion) in 2016 (ibid: 16). This would take up half the 
overseas aid budget (ibid: 17). This, for Over, is highly problematic because: 
‘Those people whose lives currently are sustained by donor funding of their 
AIDS treatment may feel that they are entitled to continuation of that 
treatment, that their donor has entered into an implicit contract to provide 
life-sustaining drugs in exchange for their conscientious adherence. 
Furthermore, international and domestic opinion will hold donors 
responsible for maintaining treatment subsidies to individuals who have 
already started treatment’ (ibid: 18).  
 
Note that Over acknowledges that ‘international and domestic opinion’ will 
probably put pressure on donors to continue treatment. But rather than seeing 
this as a social preference to be taken seriously, the clear implication of his 
argument is that some other agenda would be better (another example of the 
‘omniscient economist fallacy’).    
 
Over makes a compelling case that commitments to ART funding will reduce 
the space for other, ‘discretionary’ development funding – but then goes on to 
make the far less compelling (we would say, bizarre) case that the situation is 
bad for people on ART as well: ‘From the recipient’s side, the downside of 
entitlements is dependency. Those who receive entitlements typically become 
dependent on them, and never more starkly than in the case of expensive life-
giving drugs (ibid: 18). Of course people are necessarily ‘dependent’ on 
medication that is keeping them alive but how could this possibly be worse than 
not being dependent – i.e. being dead? He tries to argue that dependency is bad 
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for developing country governments too (in that it ties them to the US in a ‘post-
modern colonial relationship’ (ibid: 21)) – but ultimately his argument is one 
about US political interests.  
 
Over’s solution is two-fold: that the US should back away from bilateral funding 
of ART and should instead channel support for treatment through multilateral 
institutions like the Global Fund; and that more funding should be earmarked for 
HIV prevention rather than treatment. Although he also proposes a set of 
uncontroversial policies, such as supporting projects to promote adherence, 
creating a volunteer service to provide human resources for health to developing 
countries and promoting access to generic drugs, his juxtaposition of treatment 
versus prevention harks back to the pre-ART rollout days when no research was 
available to inform the debate. He assumes that ART will probably worsen the 
epidemic – a stance which ignores the evidence showing that ART has benefits 
for HIV prevention (see earlier discussion).  
 
Over’s undue pessimism about the impact of ART on HIV prevention is 
matched by his gloomy take on the impact of the ART rollout on the health 
systems – an analysis which also fails to take into account any cost-savings and 
released pressure on the system resulting from fewer AIDS-related opportunistic 
infections (ibid: 24-5). As studies from Brazil (Levi and Vitória, 2002) and 
South Africa (Badri et al, 2006) have shown, rolling out ART can actually be 
cost-savings in this respect. By ignoring it, Over commits the ‘myopic 
economist fallacy’.   
 
Like Easterly, Over believes that more money should be allocated to HIV 
prevention (ibid: 30). But neither of them mobilise any evidence to support why 
prevention will be more successful at combating the HIV epidemic than ART. 
The HIV prevention they champion in opposition to ART is an ideal theoretical 
construct, which seems to assume that a powerful, evidence-based 
armamentarium of interventions with population-level efficacy exists and all we 
need are the resources and political will to make them available more widely. In 
fact, except for male circumcision, needle exchange for drug users and a few 
other interventions among certain risk groups such as sex workers, clear 
evidence of population level impact of HIV prevention programs is scarce (Potts 
et al, 2009). A case can be made that large shifts in incidence have been due 
more to spontaneous community mobilisation than to public health 
programming.16 Indeed, the record for prevention interventions is so 
disappointing that it is one of the reasons for continued interest in ART as a 
lynch-pin for HIV prevention (e.g. Granich et al, 2009).  
                                                 
16  See Epstein, 2007 for a discussion of Uganda. 
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Over acknowledges the problem by calling for more research into HIV 
prevention (ibid: 14, 32). However, prevention research is currently largely 
focused on biomedical interventions, such as vaccines and microbicides, which 
due to scientific obstacles, may take decades to arrive. The failure of HIV 
prevention programming is not because of the lack of resources alone but a 
weak scientific basis for the interventions currently in use; a narrow conception 
of prevention which emphasises biomedical approaches; the collapsing of non-
biomedical approaches into behavior change models which emphasise individual 
psychology rather than the structural factors which drive risk; and a failure of 
HIV prevention proponents to evaluate their own work critically. Framing a case 
for HIV prevention simply as one about resources alone paves the way for 
continued ‘prevention failure’ which is in no one’s interest and could set back 





We have argued that the backlash against AIDS-related funding, especially 
ART, runs the risk of abandoning the very mechanisms – i.e. a mobilised civil 
society – which made positive changes to health systems possible in the first 
place. Roger England’s critique of AIDS is based on an idealised notion of 
health systems development largely based on theory without confronting the 
historical or political realities which have hampered the quest for the lofty 
notions of health for all enshrined in the Alma Ata Declaration.   
 
The pendulum swing back to supporting health systems rather than disease-
specific interventions is evident within the IHP (as noted earlier), in recent DfiD 
statements and actions and in Oxfam UK’s call for a ‘moratorium’ on new 
vertical health initiatives. AIDS activists in the South, most of whom are strong 
supporters of primary health care and of building more efficient, accountable 
and redistributive developmental states, now find themselves in conflict with 
their erstwhile allies and donors. They recognise that better health systems are 
key to a sustainable and effective AIDS response – but they are correctly 
suspicious of calls to divert resources from dedicated programmes to general 
‘capacity building’. As Easterly would himself remind us, non-targeted donor 
support is too easily wasted, diverted or – in the case of countries undergoing 
IMF adjustment programs – simply used to shore up foreign reserves.   
 
We have come a long way since the idea of development was first mooted by 
colonial bureaucrats in the 1940s. We have learned that approaching 
development policy through the lens of public administration rather than 
political-economy is doomed to failure. Unless development policies can be 
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aligned with the political incentives facing public officials, they will not be 
implemented successfully – no matter how rationally or efficiently they are 
designed by donors and development planners. This is why developmental 
discourse, unless firmly located within a broader strategy to ensure concrete, 
desired action on the part of national governments, is in danger of becoming 
little more than rhetoric. Worse still, it may be a cynical rhetoric because 
experience has shown us, time and time again, that money for ‘capacity 
building’ and ‘general budget support’ is all too easily captured and redirected to 
other ends. Civil society representatives involved in IHP processes are already 
complaining about how difficult it is to hold governments to account for the way 
they intend to disburse funds for general health systems support.  
 
The IHP’s commitment to strengthening health systems is commendable but we 
need a more nuanced approach to combating epidemics like AIDS and TB, 
indeed other priority areas which cause high morbidity and mortality in the 
developing world such as childhood diarrhoea and other infectious diseases. We 
need to strengthen health systems in ways that acknowledge the need for some 
verticality for these epidemics and other health issues. A shift which weakens 
the Global Fund, or broadens its mandate to make it too general (i.e. transform it 
into a Global Health Fund) could undermine both AIDS interventions and the 
civil society mobilisation which generated and supported the push for better 
AIDS interventions and better health care.   
 
AIDS has been remarkably successful in overturning assumptions about 
international aid and public health interventions in the developing world. Ooms 
(2008) goes so far as arguing that there has been a ‘paradigm shift’ in the mind 
of donors away from short-term, emergency-related, aid for health towards 
greater acceptance of long-term dependence of developing countries on foreign 
aid flows. But even if this paradigm shift exists for some donors, it is neither 
universal, nor stable – as the backlash demonstrates clearly. The fact that AIDS 
funding has grown so fast, to the point where the share of funding for AIDS is 
broadly in line with the share of AIDS in the global burden of diseases (Stuckler 
et al, 2008: 1565) means that AIDS funding is now particularly vulnerable to the 
trade-off questions posed by Easterly back in 2006. Unless these are posed 
squarely and addressed systematically and reasonably, the ‘paradigm shift’ in 
favour of AIDS and health will disappear like the morning mist. And for the 
trade-off questions to be posed in this manner, we need to cut below the 
moralised discourse about aid flows at aggregate, global, level, to more country-
specific analyses of what is actually needed. And in this respect, a critical, 




So how can economists help?  We argue that key research needs include: 
1. Country-specific explorations of health and development priorities and 
whether other economic policies, notably IMF-imposed fiscal ceilings, are 
acting as impediments to the efficient use of donor funds. Such analysis 
should take social preferences seriously and acknowledge political-
economic constraints.   
2. Designing health interventions which will not get hijacked by rent-seekers, 
subverted by unaccountable bureaucracies or implemented in ways that 
cannot be monitored by civil society organisations. Put differently, this 
means designing interventions which can be championed, monitored and 
implemented by Easterly’s innovators/searchers. This entails cost-
effectiveness analysis, but in a way that incorporates explicit institutional 
and political analysis of whether and how ‘effective’ interventions can be 
introduced and sustained.  
3. Exploring how to harness the power of civil society organisations to assist 
with the AIDS response and to monitor and hold governments to account. 
Not all civil society initiatives are as successful as others and there is a 
clear need for innovative forms of assessment.  
4. Exploring how to maximise synergies in health and development spending. 
The backlash against AIDS funding has created an unhelpful discourse in 
which disease is pitted against disease, and health against development and 
‘horizontal’ against ‘vertical’ interventions. This detracts energy and 
attention away from the crucial – but infinitely more difficult – task of 
ensuring synergies between AIDS interventions, primary health and 
development programs. This means pushing economic analysis into new 
territories and to encourage economists to engage not only with narrow 
economic variables, but also with institutional design, political process and 
broader social/economic objectives.  
 
To return to our opening observations about the impact of the global crisis; 
today’s world is one of shrinking budgets and difficult trade-offs. The political 
and economic environment is becoming harsher by the day for AIDS-related 
funding. But this does not mean that it will be impossible to keep up the fight 
against HIV, and it does not mean that the AIDS funding agenda should 
necessarily cede ground to other financial or developmental priorities. Cost-
effectiveness analysis can help shape the public debate about how to prioritise 
development interventions. But such calculations should inform such debate, not 
pre-empt it. Real political and institutional dynamics shape what is possible, and 
social contestation over values and priorities profoundly affects the rank-
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